Thanks to these preposterous misjudgments, Moscow has transformed its once shaky, backward system into the most powerful offensive force in the world.
Has the U.S. learned anything from such historic blunders? Seemingly, not at all.
Precisely as with the USSR 40 years ago, Red China remains both poor and strategically enfeebled. Yet now, as a "counter-balance" to the USSR, "State" is intent on building up the world's largest Marxist dictatorship....
Because the survival of the Republic of China is of such critical strategic and economic importance... I have just travelled to the Far East to study the position.
I was fortunate. While there, I spoke to some in the highest places in the Taipei government.
Let's telescope these interviews.
There is much talk about a possible Taiwanese rapprochement with Peking? Reply: "Personal experience of Communism is the best teacher. There is an old saying, 'Once bitten by a snake, one is shy even of a rope.'''
Could Red China ever prove a trustworthy ally of any Western, capitalist state? The consensus of those to whom I spoke is that U.S.... policies are based on four main ... misconceptions:
˙ Many Americans believe there is an irreversible rift between Peking and Moscow;
˙ They believe there is a strong possibility of an open and large-scale conflict between Moscow and Peking;
˙ They believe that, because of the reversal of so many of Mao's policies, the seeds of democracy are being sown; that Peking today is more liberal than under Mao; that it is perhaps moving to wards a Yugoslav situation;
˙ They believe that a nominally friendly Red China somehow acts as a counterweight to the Soviet threat.
All these are seen (and not in Taipei alone) as "very, very" grave misconceptions. The Chicoms, it is pointed out, remain demonstrably dedicated Communists. They are fighting for Communism, have vowed to destroy the capitalist world.
Despite its carefully cultivated U.S. connection, Peking continues actively to work against vital Western positions in the Third World, in Southeast Asia, Southern Africa and Latin America.
Why, then, should the State Department repeat with the Chicoms exactly the same deadly mistakes it has already made with the USSR?
The concept, as "State" sees it, is to build a "ring of containment" around the USSR, to counter growing Soviet power by constructing a strong Peking-Tokyo-Washington axis.
Few among the pro-Western states in Southeast Asia share Washington's confidence.
The five ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand, have all publicly declared their concern over the Red Chinese threat in the coming decade. All are already suffering either actual or psychological pressure from Peking.
All are threatened by domestic Communist parties loyal to Peking. All fear that the U.S. relationship with Peking will be used to Red China's advantage in Southeast Asia.
None can understand why the U.S. (should allow) Peking to set the terms for any dealings with the Republic of China.
All are convinced that the U.S. would be far better advised to rely on a strong Pacific Basin alliance of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand.
Peking's leaders, they warn, are not trying to move Red China closer to the Western world, to transform it into a free enterprise system, but rather to strengthen their system so that they can more effectively move in on the remainder of Asia.
Malaysian officials see Peking's links with Communist parties in Southeast Asia as a greater threat to their own survival than that posed by Moscow.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja told Newsweek the same thing: "We all agree that ultimately... the biggest threat in the region is Red China."
Nor do the warnings come from the Southeast Asians alone. Writing in the latest issue of the immensely influential U.S. journal Foreign Affairs, political scientist Professor Bernard K. Gordon warned: "East Asian leaders believe that the U.S. overrates the meaning of the strategic consensus with Peking and at the same time underrates Red China's propensity for regional trouble making."